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Abstract. In this document we share the experiences gained throughout
the development of a metro system case study. The model is constructed
in Event-B using its respective tool set, the Rodin platform. Starting
from requirements, adding more details to the model in a stepwise man-
ner through refinement, we identify some keys points and available plug-
ins necessary for modelling large systems (requirement engineering, de-
composition, generic instantiation, among others), which ones are lacking
plus strengths and weaknesses of the tool.
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1 Introduction
Event-B [1] is a formal method that allows modelling and refinement of systems.
From the experiences during DEPLOY1, there exists a natural instinct to model
a system such that it mimics its implementation. That is not always the best
approach: models should be used to understand the system and its behaviour;
the implementation should be seen as an independent task. This document aims
to guide modellers by describing the experiences gained throughout the devel-
opment of a metro system case study, suggesting “rules of thumb”, modelling
techniques and assessing the current tool support (Rodin platform [2]).
We build a metro system model in a “top-down” style, in Event-B based on
safety properties, starting from an abstraction view of the system and gradually
augmented it with more details. Generic instantiation [3,4,5] and decomposi-
tion [6] are techniques used in the case study, simplifying the formal development
by reusing existing models and avoiding re-proofs. Some requirements are based
on real ones for metro system carriage doors.
A brief overview of the Event-B language is given in Section 2. The construc-
tion of the metro system model is described in Section 3, including a discussion of
the keys points for building of a formal model such as requirements, abstraction,
refinement, proofs, decomposition, generic instantiation in the Rodin platform.
We finish with conclusions and related work in Section 4.
1 DEPLOY - Industrial deployment of system engineering methods providing high
dependability and productivity - supported by the EU Commission (Grant 214158)
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2 Background
Event-B is a formal modelling method for developing correct-by-construction
hardware and software systems. An Event-B specification is divided into two
parts: a static part called context and a dynamic part called machine. A ma-
chine SEES as many contexts as desired. A context consists of sets, constants
and assumptions (axioms) of the system. An Event-B model is a state transition
system where the state corresponds to variables v and transitions are repre-
sented by a collection of events evt in machines. The most general form of an
event is: evt =̂ any t where G(t, v) then S(t, v, v′) end , where t is a set
of parameters, G(t, v) is the enabling condition (called guard) and S(t, v, v′) is
a before-after predicate computing after state v′. Essential to Event-B is the
formulation of invariants I(v): safety conditions/properties to be preserved at
all times. Proof obligations (PO) are generated for all system transitions to vali-
date and ensure that these conditions are preserved. Because Event-B advocates
the use of refinement, additional PO (forward refinement) [1] are generated to
ensure that concrete refinements preserve the abstract models’ properties. The
Event-B toolset is Rodin [2], result of an EU research project2: software tool,
based on modern software programming tools created to help the development
of specifications based on the idea that large complex or critical projects should
start with modelling and reasoning about its specification.
3 Case study construction
In this section the steps followed throughout the construction of our model are
described. The safety-critical metro system case study describes a formal ap-
proach for the development of embedded controllers for a metro3. Butler [7]
makes a description of embedded controllers for a railway using classical B. Our
starting point is based on that work but applied to a metro system. That work
goes as far as our first decomposition. We augment it by refining sub-components,
adding requirements and instantiating emergency and service doors in carriages.
3.1 Requirements
Requirements analysis [8] in systems engineering, encompasses tasks that go into
determining the needs or conditions to meet for a new or altered product, tak-
ing account possible conflicting requirements of the various stakeholders, such as
beneficiaries or users. There are several techniques to deal with requirements and
they vary according to projects’ domains. Moreover guidelines [8] have been de-
veloped to achieve this goal. Nevertheless requirements are often described in an
informal manner. Consequently it is hard to reason about each requirement: ex-
perienced people are able to detect contradictions and uncertainties but it is not
2 RODIN:Rigorous Open Development Environment for Open Systems (EU IST Proj)
3 The Event-B model built is available at http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/23135/
guaranteed that all will be uncovered. Moreover, within the formal methods do-
main, it is hard to trace informal requirements with the model/implementation.
Although not available when we developed this case study, a requirement
plug-in (ProR [9,10]) now exists for the Rodin platform, supporting ReqIF 1.0.1
Standard4. Benefits of ProR are incremental creation of hierarchical require-
ments structures from informal requirements or providing traceability between
requirements and formal models. Furthermore, the system description, mixing
formal and informal artefacts may contain assumptions about the environment
or requirements properties and ProR can reason about them (possibly uncover-
ing contradictions and uncertainties).
Our metro system is characterised by trains, tracks circuits (also called sec-
tions or CDV and a communication entity (comms) that allows the interaction
between trains and tracks. The trains circulate in sections and before a train
enters or leaves a section, a permission notification must be received. In case of
hazard situations, trains receive braking notifications. Track is responsible for
controlling the sections, changing switch directions (switch is a special section
that connects different routes and can be either divergent or convergent) and
sending signalling messages to the communication entity. These are the main
requirements for this case study (some described in Fig. 1):
1. Route sections are all connected and cannot have empty gaps (inv1).
2. There are no loops in the route sections: sections cannot introduce loops
(thm3). Moreover no circularity is allowed (via transitive closure: thm4).
3. Switches cannot be connected and can be either divergence or convergent.
4. Non-switches have at most one successor and at most one predecessor section.
5. Trains circulate in tracks (inv4, inv5, inv7), preserving transitive closure.
6. Trains occupy at least one section plus a safety distance (inv4).
7. Trains cannot be in the same section at the same time (trains crashed: inv13).
8. Comms handles messages exchanged between trains and tracks. Trains head-
ing to an occupied section receive a negative access and braking message.
9. As part of the safety requirements, all trains have an emergency button.
10. While the emergency button is enabled, the train cannot speed up (braking).
11. If a train door is opened, then the train is stopped (in a platform or due to
an emergency). In contrast, if the train is moving, then its doors are closed.
3.2 Abstraction
Following a “top-down” design, the development starts with an abstraction
model: description that encompasses the main aspects and goals the system
intends to answer, obstructing itself from the implementation and other details.
Getting a good abstraction is a very hard task requiring an accurate under-
standing of the system. Moreover the abstraction is the basis of the development
playing a crucial role in the entire model. A good abstraction is often not achieved
at first attempt even for experienced developers. It may change throughout the
4 ReqIF: Requirements Interchange Format - http://www.omg.org/spec/ReqIF/
development to fit additional requirements that came into play on a later stage
or when, after a few refinements, it does not fit exactly as initially desired. No
tools are available that help finding the right abstraction mainly because each
system has its specific properties. It often relies on experience and empiric re-
search. Nevertheless we believe that systems can be categorised according to
some common properties, architecture and behaviours and therefore having a
abstraction template repository could be helpful when starting a model devel-
opment. Abstraction templates could then be customised according to specific
needs. Unfortunately such repository does not yet exist, requiring further inves-
tigation beyond the scope of this paper.
For our abstraction model (Fig. 1), we focus on the main properties: tracks
are divided into sections that are connected (Reqs. 1, 2, 3, 4); trains circulate in
tracks (Req. 5); the most important (safety) global property introduced initially
states that trains cannot be in the same section at the same time (Reqs. 6, 7).
machine MetroSystem_M0 sees MetroSystem_C0 
 
variables next // Currrent connectivity based on switch positions 
          trns // Set of trains on network 
          occp // Occupancy function for section 
          occpA // Initial cdv occupied by train 
          occpZ // Final   cdv occupied by train 
          braking speed 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 next ! net 
  @inv2 next " CDV # CDV 
  @inv3 trns ! TRAIN 
  @inv4 occp " CDV $ trns 
  @inv5 occpA " trns % CDV 
  @inv6 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpA(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv7 occpZ " trns % CDV 
  @inv8 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpZ(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv9 braking ! trns 
  @inv10 speed " trns % ) 
  @inv11 &tt·tt"trns * card(occp([{tt}])>1 ' occpA(tt) + occpZ(tt)  
  @inv12 finite(occp() 
  @inv13 &t1,t2·t1"trns * t2"trns * t1+t2 ' occp([{t1}],occp([{t2}]=- 
  theorem @thm1 next " cdvfn 
  theorem @thm2 tcl(next) = next . (next;tcl(next)) // tcl(next) is a fixed 
point 
  theorem @thm3 (&s·s!next([s]'s=-)'tcl(next),(CDV / id)=- // next has no 
loops 
  theorem @thm4 &tt,s·tt"trns * s ! next0occp([{tt}] ' tcl(s) = s .  
(s;tcl(s)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 next 1 next0 
      @act2 trns 1 - 
      @act3 occp 1 - 
      @act4 occpA 1 - 
      @act5 occpZ 1 - // occpZ ! " 
      @act6 braking 1 - 
      @act7 speed 1 - 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Excerpt of MetroSystem M0 : variables and invariants
3.3 Refinement
Refinement allows the co struction of a model in a gradual way, making it closer
to an implementation [3]. At same time, the overall correctness of the system
is preserved. Our case study heavily uses refinement as seen in Fig. 2. At each
refinement step, new requirements are introduced to the model and consequently
new invariants, variables, events are introduced or refined. For instance, for re-
finement Train M1, the invariants and properties imposed are:
1. There is a limit to the number of carriages per train.
2. If a carriage alarm is activated, the train’s emergency button is also active.
3. The sum of carriage doors corresponds to the doors of a train.
4. Trains have states: maintenance, manual, automatic.
5. If a train is not in a maintenance state, then it must have the correct number
of carriages and the leader carriage must be defined already.
6. If a train is in maintenance, then it must be stopped.
7. The emergency brake is activated if a train exceeds the maximum speed.
Do it right at first/Recursion As for abstraction, refinement steps are not
reached at first attempt. They evolve, accommodate different requirements and
also change, impacting previous refinements. And that comes with a cost : a
change in the abstraction, affects all the following refinements and the adjust-
ment to each refinement level has to be done manually, which is cumbersome.
In our case, the emergency brake requirement (Req. 9) was only added after we
had reached the first decomposition. The consequences propagated to the ab-
straction, impacting most events and manual reproving (which delayed for a few
days the progress achieved before). This is a limitation of the refinement process
in the tool that does not propagate the changes, requiring improvements.
3.4 Proofs and model construction
Proofs play an important role in formal modelling, checking that properties and
behaviours are preserved. There is always a compromise between representing a
system, avoiding complex proofs and tool limitations. Despite the plug-ins avail-
able for automated proof solving (AtelierB provers [11], Relevance Filter[12]),
complex proofs tend to be avoided. From our experience, a complex proof hard
(but not impossible) to discharge, often means that the model is overcomplicated
and may be rewritten/simplified. When building Train M2, train doors were rep-
resented as (DOOR CARRIAGE; train carriage)−1, where DOOR CARRIAGE ∈
DOOR→CARRIAGE represents carriage doors and train carriage ∈ CARRIAGE
7→trns represents the train carriages. Although that relation is enough to describe
which doors are part of a train, from a proof viewpoint was very unsuccessful.
By rewriting train doors as variable door train carriage = (DOOR CARRIAGE;
train carriage)−1 and invariants door train carriage ∈ trns↔DOOR,
door train carriage−1 ∈ DOOR 7→ trns, we solved the issue.
From a tool viewpoint, there is a direct relation between the number of
PO per refinement and performance. Our criteria to choose which properties to
add per refinement were directly related with the PO generated per refinement:
if over 150 PO, additional properties were stated in new refinements. Train
requirements are spread over 4 refinement steps for that reason. Improvements
have been made in terms of tool performance in the latest releases but large
developments (over 15 refinements and large number of events) are still affected.
3.5 Decomposition
The “top-down” style of development used in Event-B allows the introduction
of new events and data-refinement of variables during refinement steps. A con-
sequence of this development style is an increasing complexity of the refinement
process when dealing with many events and state variables. Model decomposi-
tion [6] addresses such complexity by cutting a large model into smaller com-
ponents. Two methods have been identified for the Event-B decomposition and
are supported by a Rodin plug-in [6]: shared variable [3] and shared event [13].
Because decomposition is monotonic [13], the generated sub-components can be
further refined independently: sub-components can be used to further refined
the original model or be used in other models. Moreover team development
can be introduced: different developers can share parts of the same original
model by working independently in parallel with the resulting decomposition
sub-components. Decomposition also partition PO which are expected to be
easier to discharge in sub-components. In our model, decomposition is used for
following reasons: separation of aspects; model architectural decision; tool per-
formance: building/proving is faster for separated models than for monolithics.
Decomposition is recursively used as seen in Fig. 2: splitting the initial mono-
lithic model into three parts (Train, Middleware and Track) from an archi-
tectural point of view (separation of aspects); splitting Train M4 into Leader-
Carriage (due to the number of POs and separation of aspects) and Carriage
and later on to decompose Carriage into CarriageInterface and CarriageDoor
(Fig. 3(b)). Although we could have used either decomposition styles, we used
the shared event style mainly because in that manner, we did not constrain the
refinement of variables (like it happens for shared variables).
Unfortunately the decomposition process does not propagate modifications
on the original machine and consequently, decomposed components need to be
regenerated if the original component is modified. If the decomposed compo-
nents have been refined, than the modifications need to be reflected in those
refinements (notified via errors or PO being generated or requiring reproving).
We believe that the decomposition tool requires improvements in terms of prop-
agation changes to minimise the overall impact that is inevitable.
Fig. 2. Overall view of the metro system development
3.6 Generic Instantiation
Generic Instantiation can be seen as a way of reusing components and solving
difficulties raised by the construction of large and complex models [3]. Generic
developments (single machine or a chain of refinements) are reused, originating
components with similar properties instead of starting from scratch. Reusabil-
ity occurs via the instantiation and parameterisation of patterns. [4] proposes a
generic instantiation approach for Event-B by instantiating machines. The goal
is to reuse a pattern as an instance in an existing development (problem) consist-
ing of a chain of refinement of machines S0 to Sk (S stands for Specific problem)
as seen in Fig. 3(a). The instance sees the parameterisation context CIG (that
(a) Instantiation of G0..Gj via
parameterisation context CIG
creating instance IG to fit
problem S0..Sk.
(b) Carriage Refinement Diagram and Door In-
stantiation
Fig. 3. Generic Instantiation
extends the specific problem context CS) containing the replacement properties
for the elements in context CGi. Variables, events and parameters can be re-
named to fit new or existing elements in the specific problem. The correctness
of the instantiation relies on reusing the pattern PO and ensuring that assump-
tions in the context parameterisation are satisfied in the instance. In our case
study, an existing development of carriage doors (GCDoor M0..GCDoor M2 ) is
used as a pattern with all the related PO previously discharged. The pattern
is instantiated and parameterised accordingly into emergency doors and service
doors (Fig. 3(b)). The main pattern requirements are:
1. Doors have a state associated: open (train must be stopped) or closed.
2. When adding/removing a carriage to a train, doors must be closed for safety.
3. Actions involving the doors may result from commands (open, close, isolate,
remove isolated) sent from the central door control.
4. Doors must be closed and locked before a train starts moving.
5. Doors are opened by the following devices: manual platform, manual internal
or automatic central door.
6. Doors can get obstructed when closed automatically (people/object obstruc-
tion). If an obstruction is detected, a second attempt is made to close them.
7. Doors can be isolated in case of malfunction or for safety reasons.
8. If a door is obstructed, then it must be in a state corresponding to open.
These requirements are shared between both emergency and service doors
highlighting the use of instantiation. Additional requirements for each kind of
door can be added in further refinements (emergency doors are only available
for emergencies, do not respond to standard open command, etc). For our case,
the instantiation was manual. Nevertheless currently a generic instantiation pro-
totype is available [5]. The tool needs to mature and requires improvements in
terms of matching the pattern and the last refinement of problem. In this case
study, the matching was manually achieved through decomposition.
Animation/Model Checker and Code Generation Although we are mainly
interested in safety properties, ProB model checker [14] proved to be a very useful
tool. At some stages, all PO were discharged but ProB showed that the system
was deadlocked. In larger developments, these situations may occur frequently.
Therefore we suggest safety properties preservation (via PO) and running ProB
to confirm deadlock freeness. Another option, to be addressed by ADVANCE5 is
to introduce liveness properties (e.g. enabledness). Regarding implementation, a
code generation plug-in6 [15] (Event-B to Ada or C) is available.
Statistics Table 1 describes the statistics of the model in terms of variables,
events and PO (including automatically discharged) for each refinement. Al-
most 3/4 of the PO were discharged automatically. The case study conditions
Vars Events PO/Auto
TransitiveClosureCtx − − 10/10
MetroSystem C0 − − 5/3
MetroSystem C1 − − 0/0
MetroSystem M0 7 10 75/64
MetroSystem M1 10 13 17/17
MetroSystem M2 12 17 78/57
MetroSystem M3 12 17 24/22
Track 4 10 0/0
Train 7 14 0/0
Middleware 1 4 0/0
Train M1 9 16 74/52
Train M2 13 21 155/79
Vars Events PO/Auto
Train M3 12 21 65/24
Train M4 14 21 119/89
LeaderCarriage 9 21 0/0
Carriage 5 11 0/0
Carriage M1 6 11 28/21
CarriageInterface 4 11 0/0
CarriageDoors 2 5 0/0
CarriageDoorsInst M0 2 5 2/1
GCDoor M0 2 5 6/6
GCDoor M1 9 15 81/80
GCDoor M2 10 22 170/153
Total 909/678(74.6%)
Table 1. Statistics of the metro system case study
5 ADVANCE project: Advanced Design and Verification Environment for Cyber-
physical System Engineering- http://www.advance-ict.eu/
6 Code generation plug-in: http://wiki.event-b.org/index.php/Code_Generation
were the following: Rodin v2.1 (Auto Builder: OFF; Auto Prover: OFF), Model
Decomposition v1.2.1 and Shared Event Composition plug-in v1.3.1, Generic
instantiation was done manually (tool support was not available), ProB v2.1.2.
4 Related Work and Conclusions
From the experience of developing formal models involving a large number of re-
finements, development tools reach a saturation point where it is not possible to
edit the model due to the high amount of resources required (or very slowly). De-
composition is a possible solution that alleviates the issue by splitting the model
into tool manageable dimensions, separating concerns, decreasing the number
of events and variables per sub-component which results in more manageable
models. Generic instantiation reuses pattern and respective PO per instance.
The experience of modelling a metro system in Event-B using the Rodin
platform and its plugins, is shared in terms of model design and assessment
of available tools. Requirements are defined and modelled through refinement.
As an architectural decision and to alleviate the problem of modelling a mono-
lithic component, the model is decomposed several times. Benefiting from an
existing development for carriage doors GCDoor, this pattern is used to instan-
tiate two kind of carriage doors: service and emergency doors. The refinement
of Carriage is decomposed, originating CarriageDoor that matches with pattern
GCDoor M0. Although the instantiation is similar for both cases, the resulting
instances can be further refined independently. Generic instantiation minimises
the proving effort reusing the pattern GCDoor PO (in the overall 257). Therefore
we achieve our goal of reusing existing developments and discharging as little
PO as possible. Even the interactive proofs were relatively easy to discharge
once the correct tactic was discovered. This task would be more difficult with-
out decomposition due to the elevated number of hypotheses to be considered.
Nevertheless the effort of discharging PO could be further minimised by having
an easy way to reuse PO tactics. A limitation of this model is not addressing
liveness properties through proofs which would enrich the model.
Although we use Event-B, these techniques are generic enough to suit other
formal notations and other case studies. Formal methods has been widely used
to validate requirements of real systems. The systems are formally described
and properties are checked to be preserved whenever a system transition occurs.
Usually this result in complex models with several properties to be preserved,
therefore structuring and reusability are pursued to facilitate the development.
Lutz [16] describes the reuse of formal methods when analysing the requirements
and designing the software between two spacecrafts’ formal models. Stepney et
al. [17] propose patterns to be applied to formal methods in system engineering.
Using the Z notation, several patterns (and anti-patterns) are identified and
catalogued to fit particular kind of models. These patterns introduce structure to
the models and aim to aid formal model developers to choose the best approach
to model a system, using some examples. Although the patterns are expressed
for Z, they are generic enough to be applied to other notations. Comparing with
the development of our case study, the instantiation of service and emergency
doors corresponds to the Z promotion, where a global system is specified in
terms of multiple instances of local states and operations. Although there is
not an explicit separation of local and global states in our case study, service
and emergency doors states are connected to the state of CarriageDoor and
we even use decomposition, instantiation and refactoring to fit into a specific
pattern. Stepney [17] suggests template support and architecture patterns to be
supported by tools. We agree and aim to address this issue in the future by
having categorised templates customised according to the modeller’s needs.
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